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Face-Veil Bans and Anti-Mask Laws:
State Interests and the Right to Cover the
Face
By EVAN DARWIN WINET*
... because certain individuals need to conceal their identities in
order to speak publicly, the anonymity provided by their masks is
inextricably intertwined with their right to free speech.
-Stephen J. Simoni'
Covering one's face from the view of others is a way of protecting
one's anonymity. The right to anonymity, if there is such a right, is
closely linked to the right of privacy that is guaranteed by the
French civil code and by the European Convention on Human
Rights. On public streets or in an outdoor market, one's anonymity
enjoys legal protection from photographers. Other than permitting
identification, there would appear to be no legitimate public
interest in compelling people to expose their faces.
-Ronald Sokol2
I. Introduction
In the new millennium, a series of nations have advanced
legislation banning the wearing of face-veils. France and Belgium
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Ph.D.
in Drama and the Humanities, Stanford University, 2001. The author has published
previously on the subject of modern theatre in the Islamic world, especially in
Indonesia.
1. Stephen J. Simoni, "Who Goes There?"-Proposing a Model Anti-Mask Act,
61 FORDHAM L. REV. 241, 251 (1992).
2. Ronald Sokol, My Burqa Is None of Your Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/03/opinion/03iht-edsokol.html.
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passed general bans against covering the face in public in 2010 and
2011, respectively. The Italian parliament reviewed a similar bill in
at the end of 2011.4 The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and several
states of Australia have all introduced measures imposing fines or
other penalties for wearing face-veils in any public space.' Syria,
Egypt, and Sweden have all passed bans against face-veils in public
schools. These measures grant school supervisors and education
boards various powers to expel students or fire teachers found in
breach.' The British government, though it has not thus far passed
any laws regulating face-veils, has upheld the discretion of public
schools in enforcing uniform policies that preclude the wearing of
face-veils.' Various other countries, including Tunisia, France,
Germany, Kosovo and Singapore, had already implicitly banned face-
3. See Law No. 2010-1192 of Oct. 11, 2010, Journal Officiel de la Republique
Francaise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Oct. 11, 2011, interdisant la
dissimulation du visage dans l'espace public [Law Banning the Covering of the Face
in Public), available at http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=
JORFTEXT000022911670&categorieLien=id [hereinafter Law No. 2010-1192]; "Loi
visant A interdire le port de tout v8tement cachant totalement ou de manibre
principale le visage" [Law Banning the Covering of the Face in Public] Doc.
2011060108 (June 1, 2011), available at http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgiloil
change_1g.pl?language=fr&la=F&tablename=loi&cn=2011060108 [hereinafter Law
Banning the Covering of the Face in Public].
4. See CAMERA DEi DEPUTATI, Doc. No. 3760, XVI Legislatura 1 (Oct. 11,
2010), available at http://www.camera.it/_dati/legl6/lavori/schedela/apriTele
comandowai.asp?codice=16PDLOO25270.
5. See Tom Heneghan, Analysis: Burqa Bans: France, Then Netherlands-- Who's
Next?, REUTERS, (Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/
10/01/us-europe-burqa-analysis-idUSTRE6904MO20101001; Summary Offences
Amendment (Full-face Coverings Prohibition) Bill 2010, Amendment of Summary
Offences Act, No. 25 (1988) (N.S.W., Austl.), Schedule 1, Part 2, Division 2C, 111(1),
available at http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/nswbills.nsf/O/
1bl06ecb7420c2a8ca2576d50003dfa6/$FILE/b2006-609-d07-House.pdf [hereinafter
Summary Offences Amendment]; The Burqa Debate: Are Women's Rights Really the
Issue?, SPIEGEL ONLINE (June 24, 2010), http://www.spiegel.de/internationall
europe/0,1518,702668,00.html [hereinafter The Burqa Debate].
6. See Syria Bans Face Veils at Universities, BBC NEWS, July 19, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-10684359; Marwa Rakha, Egypt:
Niqab Ban Stirs Controversy, GLOBAL VOICES (Oct. 8, 2009),
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/10/09/egypt-niqab-ban-stirs-controversy/;
Ombudsman: Student Headscarf Ban Is Wrong, ICE NEWS, Dec. 7, 2010,
http://www.icenews.is/index.php/2010/12/07/ombudsman-student-headscarf-ban-is-
wrong/.
7. See R. v. Governors of Denbigh High School (Begum), [2006] UKHL 15,
[2007] 1 A.C. 100, [H.L.] (Mar. 22, 2006) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.)
[hereinafter Begum].
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veils in public schools through general bans restricting Islamic attire.
Turkey moved against this tide in late 2010, repealing its eighty-year
ban on Islamic attire in schools.9 Thus, a seemingly innocuous
sumptuary practice has become a major political issue in many
different countries in Europe and elsewhere.
Although these bans are typically viewed in the context of the
"headscarf debate," the specific nature of a ban on covering the face
raises different legal issues. Whereas the "headscarf debate" has
been couched in terms of a "clash of civilizations" between a secular
West and a religious East,o face-veil bans also raise the question of
whether and to what extent state interests may limit the right of
individuals to cover their own faces. A similar question has been
raised in the context of United States anti-mask laws. Originally
enacted to fight the criminal activities of the Ku Klux Klan, anti-mask
laws, in their strongest forms, prohibit wearing masks in public."
Opponents of these laws in the United States have articulated First
Amendment arguments that would apply similarly to any face-veil
ban. 12
Similarly, a right to cover the face may be found in international
law protections of expression and privacy. The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) enumerate these same rights." The
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does the same. 4 in
8. See Magdi Abdelhadi, Tunisia Attacked Over Headscarves, BBC NEWS, Sept.
26, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5382946.stm; see generally HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, DISCRIMINATION IN THE NAME OF NEUTRALITY: HEADSCARF BANS FOR
TEACHERS AND CIVIL SERVANTS IN GERMANY (2009); Mark Lowen, Headscarf Ban
Sparks Debate Over Kosovo's Identity, BBC NEWS, Aug. 23, 2010,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11065911. For more on the 2004 French
headscarf ban, see generally JOAN WALLACH ScoTr, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL
(2007); JOHN RICHARD BOWEN, WHY THE FRENCH DON'T LIKE HEADSCARVES:
ISLAM, THE STATE, AND PUBLIC SPACE (2007).
9. Jonathan Head, Quiet End to Turkey's College Headscarf Ban, BBC NEWS,
Dec. 31, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11880622.
10. SCOrr, supra note 8, at 74-75.
11. Simoni, supra note 1, at 241-42.
12. See Wayne R. Allen, Klan, Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the
First Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819, 822 (1991).
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 3 and 14, G.A. Res. 217A (III),
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
14. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, arts. 8(1), 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
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addition, the ECHR suggests that these rights may only be abrogated
where a state shows that such action is "necessary in a democratic
society." 5 This requirement resembles the requirement in United
States First Amendment law that any restriction of speech in a public
forum be "narrowly tailored" to promote a "substantial government
interest." , These international instruments suggest a line of
argument distinct from the appeals to freedom of religion, gender
equity, and minority rights typically raised in the headscarf cases. In
contrast, appeals to freedom, expression, and privacy cut to the heart
of the democratic values that niqab ban proponents often claim to
defend.
This Note reviews historical practices of masking and veiling in
Muslim and non-Muslim societies in order to contextualize anti-mask
laws and the recent Muslim face-veil bans. Part II provides a brief
survey of historical veiling and face-veiling practices in order to
disaggregate these practices both from Islam and religious devotion in
general. It challenges the assumption of many veil ban proponents
that veiling is foreign to Western civilization. Part III reviews the
framework of United States anti-mask legislation and the challenges
that have been made against these laws under the First Amendment.
Part IV surveys recent face-veil measures in different nations, the
arguments raised in favor of them, and how they fail to satisfy the
requirements under international law that restrictions of expression
and privacy be "necessary to a democratic society."
II. Face-Covering Practices, Obligations, and Restrictions
A. Face- Veils As a Subset of Historical Veiling Practices
The term voile (veil) derives from the Latin velum, which
denotes a "curtain" and connotes any cloth that forms a separation in
space." This connotation resembles that of the Arabic hijab, which
likewise denotes both curtain and garment. In popular imagination,
however, veil and, more recently, foulard (headscarf) have come to
connote clothing understood to fulfill sumptuary obligations for
15. Id. arts. 8(2), 10(2).
16. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
1136 (3d ed. 2006).
17. YEDIDA KALFON STILLMAN & NORMAN A. STILLMAN, ARAB DRESS, A SHORT
HISTORY: FROM THE DAWN OF ISLAM TO MODERN TIMES 239 (Norman A. Stillman
ed., 2000).
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women under Islamic law. These terms are now so strongly
associated with politicized Islam that many scholars avoid their usage
when discussing similar historical practices in the West." The veil and
headscarf have come to represent the Orient in the latest installment
of its "clash of civilizations" with a presumptively unveiled West.
However, both Muslim and non-Muslim societies practiced and
regulated veiling long before the birth of Islam. The earliest known
legal code on veiling is Middle Assyrian Law (MAL) 40, which
applied to the Assyrians and those under their political influence
(including, at various times, much of the Middle East and
Mediterranean worlds) from as early as 1250 B.C. 9 Like many
subsequent codes, MAL 40 presents veiling as an indicator of
respectability, and places strict limits on which social classes may wear
which styles. 20 Hittite Law 198 (c. 1400 B.C.) suggests a similar legal
attitude in that ancient society, describing the reinstatement of an
alleged adulteress by being veiled by her husband in open court.21
The evidence for Jewish veiling is ambiguous, but several passages of
the Hebrew Bible describe punishing women by means of unveiling.22
18. Llewellyn-Jones notes that classicists use terms such as "mantle," "shawl,"
"cloak," or "hood" when describing various forms of veils used in Greek and Roman
antiquity. LLOYD LLEWELLYN-JONES, APHRODITE'S TORTOISE: THE VEILED WOMAN
OF ANCIENT GREECE 5 (2003).
19. Id. at 6.
20. Middle Assyrian Law, in THE ASSYRIAN LAWS 407-09 (Godfrey Rolles Driver
& John C. Miles eds., 1935)
("Neither wives of lords nor widows nor Assyrian women who go out onto
the streets may have their heads uncovered .... The daughters of a lord . ..
whether it is [with] a shawl, robe or mantle, must veil themselves. : . . When
they go onto the streets alone, they must veil themselves. A concubine who
goes out on the streets with her mistress must veil herself.. . . A prostitute
must have her head uncovered on the street; she must not veil herself. Her
head must be uncovered . . . . He who has seen a harlot veiled must arrest
her, produce witnesses and bring her to the palace tribunal; they shall not
take her jewelry away but the one who arrested her may take her clothing;
they shall flog her fifty times and pour pitch on her head.").
21. MARTH TOBI ROTH ET AL., LAW COLLECTIONS FROM MESOPOTAMIA AND
ASIA MINOR 237 (2d. ed. 1997)
("If he brings them to the palace gate (i.e., the royal court) and says 'My
wife shall not die', he can spare his wife's life, but he must also spare the
lover, and clothe her head. If he says, 'Both of them shall die', they shall
'roll the wheel'. The king may have them killed or he may spare them.").
See also Matitiahu Tsevat, The Husband Veils the Wife (Hittite Laws 197-98), 27 J.
CUNEIFORM STUD. 235 (1975).
22. For example, Isaiah warns that the proud Jewish daughters of Babylon will be
stripped of their veils and rich apparel. Isaiah 47:1-3. See also Numbers 5:12-18;
20121 221
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The Mishna Tractate Nashim - the section of the 220 A.D. redaction
of Jewish oral traditions dealing with women - states that a Jewish
woman who goes outdoors with her head uncovered may be divorced
without return of dowry. 23 The Athenian democracy, far from
eschewing the aristocratic veil, popularized it such that veils appear in
Athenian representations of goddesses, female citizens, and
entertainers alike. 24 Greek women were forbidden from wearing veils
in certain festivals and at certain holy sites in contrast to their habitual
practice,25 and there were special police for women (gynaikonomoi)
who oversaw compliance with these dress codes. 26 An account of a
citizen divorcing his wife because she went outdoors with her head
uncovered attests to similar norms and enforcement in ancient
Rome. 27 "Honest women" likewise were compelled to wear face-veils
in the Eastern Roman Empire.28
The most influential source of veiling codes in the West is Paul's
admonition to the Corinthians that any woman who "prayeth or
prophesieth" must cover her head.29 Bishop Tertullian insisted that
Song of Solomon 5:7. See also Emile Marmorstein, The Veil in Judaism and Islam, 5
J. JEWISH STUD. 1 (1954).
23. STILLMAN & STILLMAN, supra note 17, at 144.
24. Slaves were the only exception. In Periclean Athens, as in most of the
ancient world, slaves were denied the respectability associated with wearing veils.
LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 18, at 140.
25. WILHELM DITTENBERGER, SYLLOGE INSCRIPTIONUM GRAECARUM, 736, 939
(1982).
26. Hypereides wrote, "women without order in the street were fined 1,000
drachmas." Women who violated the rules of the gynaikonomoi were also disgraced
by having their names posted in a public place. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 18, at
212.
27. The account dates from the reign of Tiberius (14-37 A.D.): "Gaius Sulpicius
Gallus... divorced his wife because he had caught her outdoors with her head
uncovered: a stiff penalty but not without certain logic. 'The law', he said, prescribes
for you my eyes alone to which you may prove your beauty. For these eyes you
should provide the ornaments of beauty, for these be lovely; entrust yourself to their
more certain knowledge. If you, with needless provocation, invite the look of anyone
else, you must be suspected of wrongdoing." VALERI MAXIMI, FACTORUM ET
DICTORUM MEMORABILIUM, 6.3.10, available at http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/
valmax6.html.
28. EMNA BEN MILED, LES TUNISIENNES ONT-ELLES UNE HISTOIRE? 224 (1998).
29. See 1 Corinthians 11:4-6. "Every man praying or prophesying, having his
head covered, dishonoureth his head." Id. at 11:4 (emphasis added). "But every
woman that prayeth or prophesieth with her head uncovered dishonoureth her head;
for that is even all one as if she were shaven." Id. at 11:5 (emphasis added). "For if
the woman be not covered, let her also be shorn: but if it be a shame for a woman to
be shorn or shaven, let her be covered." Id. at 11:6. When Christians prayed at this
[Vol. 35:1222
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head-veils mirrored a virgin's hymen, and should be worn by all
chaste women as an outward display of their virtue.'o From at least
the eleventh century, Canon Law required women to wear head-veils
called dominicals in order to receive communion." By the end of the
thirteenth century, the Church had instituted pervasive veiling codes,
such as an article of the Council of Salisbury forbidding priests from
hearing an unveiled woman's confession.32 In early modern Europe,
the fashion turned to more concealing veils, such as the manto, a
black silk cloth draped over the head and shoulders, leaving only one
eye exposed." The fashion shifted back in 1753, when the wife of the
Mayor of Seville introduced the less concealing lace mantilla. The
mantilla remained a common accessory of Euro-American Catholic
women into the twentieth century. Canon 1262 of the 1917 Code of
Canon Law confirmed this tradition by stating that women should
appear at the high altar "modestly clad and with covered heads."3 4
time, they held their arms outstretched and threw back their heads. Technically, it
would be very difficult for women to keep a typical head-veil in place while in this
position. Paul was disturbed at the unprecedented prestige implicitly claimed by
Corinthian women who spoke in tongues and worshipped while exposed in public
like this. Thus, here, he orders them to maintain their modesty while praying in
public. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 18, at 272-73.
30. TERTULLIAN, De Virg. Vel. 12.1 ("Impone velamen extrinsecushabenti
tegument intrinsecus." [Impose a veil extrinsically on her who has a covering
internally.]).
31. MARNI REVA KESSLER, SHEER PRESENCE: THE VEIL IN MANET'S PARIS XXVi
(2006).
32. AUGUSTIN CHALLAMEL ET AL., THE HISTORY OF FASHION IN FRANCE: OR,
THE DRESS OF WOMEN FROM THE GALLO-ROMAN PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 34
(Frances Cashel Hoey trans., 1882).
33. WILLIAM MAXWELL WOOD, WANDERING SKETCHES OF PEOPLE AND THINGS
IN SOUTH AMERICA, POLYNESIA, CALIFORNIA, AND OTHER PLACES VISITED DURING
A CRUISE ON BOARD OF THE U.S. SHIPS LEVANT, PORTSMOUTH, AND SAVANNAH 67-
68 (1849). One travel writer describes seeing women wearing the manto in Lima,
Peru, in the mid-nineteenth century:
"The manto is an impenetrable black-silk veil, passing from beneath the
waist of the petticoat and folded over the shoulders and head, as a kind of
hood, covering all the upper part of the person closely, except one eye; one
hand is concealed beneath this manto, holding it across the face, while the
other, particularly if handsome, or decorated by a rich ring, is permitted to
steal through a narrow opening in the manto, and through this same opening
falls the fringed or embroidered ends of a rich and bright colored silken
shawl, crimson and blue being the favorite colors."
34. Code of Canon Law, can. 1262, § 2 (1917) (". . . Muliere sautem, capite cooper
toet modes teves titae, maximae cum ad mensam Dominicam accedunt" [when women
approach the table of the Lord, it is best that they do so modestly clad and with
covered heads]).
2232012]
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Vatican II generally retreated from formalities of Catholic ritual, and
the 1983 Code of Canon Law, though it did not explicitly abrogate
Canon 1262, made no mention of veils." Women subsequently
stopped veiling in much of the Catholic world. However, since Pope
Benedict XVI's Summorum Pontificum of September 14, 2007 (an
"apostolic letter" that reinstituted the Latin Mass as one of two
acceptable forms), many communities have returned to practicing the
Extended Form 1962 Latin Mass, and there is some evidence that this
is inspiring a return of the mantilla."6
Pieces of cloth that cover part or all of the face (face-veils)17
constitute a small subset of Islamic veiling practices. Many common
forms of Islamic veiling do not involve face-veils. For example, the
"veils" worn by three Muslim schoolgirls in Creil in 1989 that sparked
the French "headscarf debate" were merely scarves, not face-veils.
Face-veils are described generally in Arabic as miqna'a.39 However,
face-veils in Muslim societies vary in terms of how they are draped,
what they are made of, whether they have eyeholes, and how much of
the face they conceal.40 Specific styles have different names in
different cultures. Some consist of lengths of fabric wrapped around
the head and face (i.e., the Turkish yashmaq). Others are face-panels
that lack eyeholes and hang over the face (i.e., the Yemeni
maghmuq). Others are made of hanging or woven horsehair (i.e., the
Persian picheh). The batalu (worn in Saudi Arabia, Oman and the
35. Proponents of Catholic veiling have argued because the 1983 Canon Law
does not explicitly abrogate Canon 1262 of the 1917 Canon Law, this earlier Canon
remained in effect. See id. They point to the rules of interpretation such as Canon 20
("A later law abrogates or derogates from an earlier law, if it expressly so states ....
A universal law, however, does not derogate from a particular or from a special law,
unless the law expressly provides otherwise") and Canon 21 ("In doubt, the
revocation of a previous law is not presumed; rather, later laws are to be related to
earlier ones and, as- far as possible, harmonized with them"). See Veiling, FISH
EATERS, http://www.fisheaters.com/theveil.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2011).
36. See, e.g., Cordelia, For Better of Worse: Mantillas Are Making a Quiet
Comeback, Catholic Phoenix, CATHOLIC PHOENIX, Sept. 20, 2010,
http://catholicphoenix.com/2010/09/20/for-better-or-worse-mantillas-are-making-a-
quiet-comeback/.
37. Llewellyn-Jones usefully distinguishes the face-veil as "a length of cloth
which is expressly designed to cover part or all of the face and is to regarded as a
separate item from the outerwrap or garment-veil, both of which can also be used to
cover the face as the situation demands." LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 18, at 41-42.
38. BOWEN, supra note 8, at 83-84.
39. STILLMAN & STILLMAN, supra note 17, at 147.
40. Llewellyn-Jones, Stillman, and Mayer all present distinct veil taxonomies.
224 [Vol. 35:1
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Emirates) is actually a full-face mask made from stiffened black cloth
reinforced with wooden sticks.41
However, the most common term in modern discussion of
Islamic face-veils is niqab. This word derives from the Arabic verb
naqaba, which means "to perforate."42 Indeed, the most obvious
attribute distinguishing the niqab from other Islamic face-veils is that
it is a full-face panel perforated with one or two eyeholes.43 In its
modern form, the niqab is generally made from a single cloth, about
thirty centimeters to one meter in length, folded for thickness. It is
now typically black, but in the Islamic classical period was more
frequently white or a light color." It is often unadorned, but may be
ornately decorated. 45 Although, as discussed supra, it is merely one of
many Islamic face-veil styles, the niqab has been worn in many Arab
societies from early in Islamic history to the present. According to
some hadith (accounts of the Prophet's life), Mohammed's wives
wore face-veils, even though this was not the common practice at the
time. 46 The wearing of hijab in general spread during the first two
centuries of Islam as the hadith and sunna (practices of the Prophet
and his community) became important sources of shari'a.47 Some
early Muslims may have viewed face-veils as part of that obligation.
By the Abbasid era, nuqub (plural of niqab) had become common
accessories for Muslim women venturing outdoors.48 Nuqub made in
the thirteenth or fourteenth centuries have been discovered in Egypt
and Nubia, and are among the oldest surviving articles of hijab.49
There is evidence that fashion for nuqub spread from the Egyptian
Mamluks to Bedouin women.
Despite this long tradition of use, most Islamic societies and
41. PATRICIA HOLTON, MOTHER WITHOUT A MASK: A WESTERNER'S STORY OF
HER ARAB FAMILY, 13, 111 (1991).
42. JENNIFER M. SCARCE, WOMEN'S COSTUME OF THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST
13 (1987).
43. On the basis of this distinction, Stillman and Stillman assign niqab one of
their four categories of face-veils. STILLMAN & STILLMAN, supra note 17, at 147.
44. Id. at 143.
45. GILLIAN VOGELSANG-EASTWOOD, VEILED IMAGES 57 (1996).
46. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 18, at 68.
47. STILLMAN & STILLMAN, supra note 17, at 140.
48. Id. at 142.
49. See Gillian Vogelsang-Eastwood, A Medieval Face-Veil From Egypt, 17
COSTUME 33, 35-36 (1983).
50. FADWA EL-GUINDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE 105 (1999).
2012]1 225
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practitioners have not viewed face-veiling as a requirement of shari'a.
It is commonly accepted that several passages in the Qur'an require
women to conceal themselves in some manner consistent with
modesty." However, opinions have varied over which areas of a
woman's body must be concealed. This question is typically phrased
in terms of which areas of a woman's body are 'awra (private because
inherently sexual).52 Whereas the prevailing view of most sunni
Muslims, regardless of madhhab (legal school), is that the face and
hands are not 'awra, a minority - including wahabi members of the
Hanbali madhhab (the majority in Saudi Arabua) - assert the
opposite.
The Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC) of Egypt, in an
opinion upholding the right of public schools to enforce a uniform
policy banning nuqub, articulated the prevailing view that the face is
not 'awra. The court held that "total veiling [of a woman] is not
known by necessity to be shar'i [a rule of shari'a]."" Furthermore,
the court noted that the commonly-accepted understanding of 'awra
does not include the face or the hands and dismissed the tradition that
Mohammed's wives wore face-veils, claiming that there is nothing in
the sunna to support "total veiling."54 Therefore, the court reasoned
that the meaning of 'awra, and hence what is required of women, is an
area of ijtihad (textual interpretation) that is open for each generation
and Islamic society to determine afresh."
Shaykh Haitham Al-Haddad, a British Saudi cleric, presented a
contrasting argument in a lecture delivered seven months after British
Labour Cabinet Minister, Jack Straw, ignited a niqab debate in the
United Kingdom by expressing his own distaste for the veil. In sharp
contrast to the Egyptian SCC (and historical evidence), Al-Haddad
51. For the most commonly cited Sura for a hijab requirement, see Qur'an 33:59,
24:31. "0 Prophet, tell your wives, your daughters, and the womenfolk of the
Believers to draw their jalabib close about them." Id. at 33:59. "Tell the female
Believers that they should lower their gaze, guard their chastity, to reveal of their
adornments only that which is apparent, and to cast their veils [khumar] over their
bosoms." Id. at 24:31.
52. See, e.g., Nathan J. Brown & Clark B. Lombardi, The Supreme Constitutional
Court of Egypt on Islamic Law, Veiling and Civil Rights: An Annotated Translation of
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17 (May 18, 1996),
21 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 437, 454 (2006).
53. Id. at 455.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 453.
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claimed: scholarly consensus that niqab is compulsory (farb) or at
least highly recommended; that face-veiling was common practice
throughout the umma throughout history; and that there has been no
cultural variation." He celebrated the normalization of hijab in the
United Kingdom, but warned Muslim women to beware
governmental pressures to "lower the bar of Islamic practices in
public."" Al-Haddad emphatically encouraged Muslim women to
view wearing niqab as a form of dawah (proselytization) that will help
to spread Islam in the United Kingdom and preserve their identities."
He even encouraged a girl barred from wearing niqab in school to
refrain from bringing suit so that a court order to remove her veil
would not embolden other schools to ban it. 9 Here, Al-Haddad
invoked niqab as a tool to be used strategically in spreading Islam in
the United Kingdom.
Outside the framework of religious law, face-veils have been
highly fashionable garments in Muslim and non-Muslim societies
alike. The most popular veil in ancient Athens, as well as Hellenic
Thebes and Alexandria, was the tegidion (little roof), a face-veil with
cut eyeholes similar to niqab.o Al-Washsha, a writer of the Abbasid
era, described a high demand for the fashionable face-veils produced
in Iranian cities such as Nishapur, Jurjan, and Sarakhs." During the
Fatimid and Ayyubid periods, a fashionable niqab could cost as much
as a working class family earned in a month.62 In medieval Europe,
aristocratic women wore longer veils to distinguish their status, and
different styles of veils influenced by Italian or French styles fell in
and out of fashion during the Renaissance.63 After briefly falling out
of fashion in the sixteenth century, white and silver veils (first
associated with weddings in the fourth century) for noble brides
returned in the seventeenth century, and women of all classes wore
56. Al-Haddad's lecture was delivered at a Sisters' Event at the Brady Centre on
May 6, 2007. See The Niqab - Part 1 of 3, YouTUBE (June 14, 2007),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RZe44SXOEBo. See also EMMA TARLO, VISIBLY
MUSLIM: FASHION, POLITICS, FAITH 141-42 (2009).
57. Id. at 142.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 18, at 61-62, 64.
61. See AL-WASHSHA', LE LIVRE DE BROCART, 171 (Siham Bouhlal French trans.,
2004).
62. STILLMAN & STILLMAN, supra note 17, at 143.
63. KESSLER, supra note 31, at xxvi-xxvii.
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black veils to protect against sun, dust, and insects in the summer." A
diverse array of fashionable veils proliferated in France and England
in the nineteenth century, made with exquisite lace and rationalized
as protection against the elements or urban dust.6 ' As they had
signaled affluence and virtue in classical antiquity, face-veils served as
symbols of femininity and youthfulness, as well as indispensible
markers of middle class respectability in Paris and London until the
turn of the twentieth century. Contemporary merchants of
fashionable hijab and niqab may invoke similar values in marketing
their wares.'
This historical perspective undermines the view of niqab as a
symbol of the "clash of civilizations" between "East" and "West."
Western and Muslim women have both worn veils in a variety of ways
and for a variety of reasons. Repressive and ideological forces, as
well as social context and voluntary expression, may have played a
role in all contexts. We should therefore be skeptical of any
regulatory measure rationalized on the basis of a single meaning
ascribed to the veil.
B. Masks Worn in Public Like Face- Veils
Given how similar they are in form, it is striking that face-veils
and masks acquired opposite symbolic associations, at least in the
West. Whereas face-veils signaled high economic status, social
respectability, and pious modesty, masks came to be associated with
disguise, duplicity, sexual license, and crime. The same Bishop
Tertullian who insisted that virgins wear veils to signal their purity
banned the pagan theater, in part because he viewed theater masks as
blasphemous.' The medieval Christian Church remained distrustful
of theatrical masking, and repeatedly banned the wearing of masks at
religious festivals. 69 Theatrical masks made a limited return in the
64. Id. at xxvii.
65. Id.
66. Id. at xxvii-xxviii.
67. See generally, TARLO, supra note 57.
68. Tertullian articulates this animosity in his treatise, De Spectaculis (c. 200
A.D.). See DAVID A. NAPIER, MASK, TRANSFORMATION, AND PARADOx 6 (1986).
69. For example, Bishop Odo of Paris banned masking at the Feast of the
Circumcision at Notre Dame in 1199, Pope Innocent III banned masking at Gniezno
in 1207, and Pope Gregory IX included general bans on public masking in his
Decretals of 1234. MEG TWYCROSS & SARAH CARPENTER, MASKS AND MASKING IN
MEDIEVAL AND EARLY TUDOR ENGLAND (2002).
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popular theater of the Renaissance, but with considerably less
respectability than in antiquity. Theatre artists themselves had
rejected masks by the end of the eighteenth century, as they
increasingly adopted Romantic notions that Tertullian himself might
have approved regarding the sincerity of the unmasked face."o In the
modern post-Freudian era, this originally Christian prejudice has
proliferated, and masks have become metaphors of concealment that
must be removed to discover our "true selves.""
Nevertheless, practices of social mask-wearing suggest the
difficulty of strictly differentiating masks and face-veils. The first
ancient Athenian theatrical masks were painted cloths, more like
what we now call veils, whereas the Greek tegidion veil, like the Arab
niqab, looked like a little mask.72 The prosopidion, likely the same
mask-like veil as the tegidion, filled much the same function as a
niqab in the Byzantine empire." The Saudi batalu, which is
effectively a mask, does not differ significantly in function from the
niqab. This style of a stiffened full-face mask with perforated
eyeholes used by women as an everyday face-veil appears in early
modern Europe as well. In the first half of the seventeenth century,
wealthy women in London wore black half-masks called vizards to
protect their faces in winter.74 In the early eighteenth century, this
practical "balaclava" had turned into a full-face black velvet mask
that women wore as a matter of course." This practice began to die
just as masquerades started to be held in the 1720s and 1730s, where
women and men could interact in a public forum that maintained full
anonymity.76 French women, in contrast, continued to wear their
70. Carlo Goldoni, an eighteenth century Italian playwright often credited with
banishing masks from the European stage, famously quipped that "the soul beneath a
mask is like a fire beneath ashes." DAVID WILES, THE MASKS OF MENANDER: SIGN
AND MEANING IN GREEK AND ROMAN PERFORMANCE 114 (1st ed. 1991).
71. Id.
72. Plato the Comic relates that the Greek phrase othonionprosopon ("linen-
covered face") was used to describe both face-veils and theatrical masks.
LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 18, at 64.
73. BEN MILED, supra note 28, at 224.
74. Christoph Heyl, The Metamorphosis of The Mask in Seventeenth- and
Eighteenth-Century London, in MASQUERADE AND IDENTITIES: ESSAYS ON GENDER,
SEXUALITY AND MARGINALITY 117 (Efrat Tseelon ed., 2001) [hereinafter
MASQUERADE AND IDENTITIES].
75. Id. at 124.
76. Id. at 130.
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black velvet half-masks, called loups (wolves)," throughout the era of
carnival balls, which began at the Paris Opera in 1715." Likewise, the
moretta, another black velvet half-mask, was worn by Venetian
women in public throughout the golden era of Venetian carnivale in
the eighteenth century.
If all these varieties of black face-masks fulfill similar social
functions as face-veils, we might well ask how any modern law could
justify distinctions between veils and a wide range of other face
coverings. What, one might ask, is the legal difference between a
face-veil and a mask worn by law-abiding citizens at a party, festival,
or political demonstration? Or a mask worn by a live street
performer? Or the visors and helmets worn by various kinds of
workers for their trades? Or the surgical masks worn by
conscientious commuters to filter contagion? Or ski-masks? Or
sunglasses?
III. United States Anti-Mask Laws
United States anti-mask laws are useful analogies to niqab bans
because the functional overlap between masks and face-veils generate
some common legal challenges distinct from those involved in more
general bans against veiling practices. Anti-mask laws must narrowly
construe their regulated practices without banning innocuous or
desirable practices such as those mentioned at the end of the previous
section. They must connect these regulations to state interests in
limiting not only religious and cultural rights, but also expressive and
anonymity rights. Lastly, concerns about domestic terrorism underlie
both anti-mask laws and the more recent niqab bans.
Most current anti-mask laws (with a few older exceptions, such as
New York's 1845 law) were written to assist law enforcement against
the Ku Klux Klan. Each of the three historical "Klans" (the one
formed briefly during Reconstruction, the "Invisible Empire" that
peaked in the 1920s, and the revived post-World War II Klan) widely
used face covering for the purposes of anonymity.79  The first
77. Jacques Derrida muses on the significance of the loup mask in the context of
a lecture on masculinity and femininity in which he equates the former with the
notion of the "sovereign" and the latter with that of "the beast" who is "stealthy as a
wolf." JACQUES DERRIDA, THE BEAST AND THE SOVEREIGN, VOL. 1, 6 (2009).
78. ANN ILAN-ALTER, Masked and Unmasked at the Opera Balls, in
MASQUERADE AND IDENTITIES 136.
79. ALLEN, supra note 12, at 822.
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Klansmen wore white robes, hoods, and masks to facilitate
anonymous "night rides" in which they terrorized blacks and radical
Republicans to intimidate them prior to the 1868 elections." The
United States Congress responded to the inability of state and local
law enforcement to apprehend the perpetrators by passing the
Enforcement Act of 1870." Section 6 of the Act (hereinafter Section
6) makes it a felony for "two or more persons ... [to] go in disguise
upon the public highway" with the intent to deprive another of civil
rights (i.e., voting). 82 The first Klan died out soon afterwards, mainly
of its own inertia, and reemerged in 1915, employing the same tactics
against blacks, Catholics, Jews, "'loose' women, unfaithful husbands,"
and a range of presumed leftists. 3 This time, states and municipalities
enacted numerous anti-mask laws, which dropped Section 6's "intent"
clause in favor of general prohibitions on public masking with
enumerated exceptions.' The third emergence of the Klan prompted
many jurisdictions that had not passed anti-mask laws earlier to do
so.1 Given that this body of law was developed in piecemeal fashion
at the local level, it is unsurprising that anti-mask laws vary
enormously across United States jurisdictions."
Anti-mask laws may be divided roughly into criminal and general
laws. The criminal laws are less problematic from the perspective of
individual rights, but less effective from the perspective of law
enforcement. The general laws are more effective, but raise
constitutional issues.
Criminal anti-mask laws follow the structure of Section 6 in
requiring some demonstrated "intent" to commit a crime separate
from the masking itself. Criminal anti-mask laws only apply where
someone commits a crime while masked, masks in order to avoid
identification that could lead to criminal or civil action,' or masks in
80. Id. at 823.
81. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
241 (1988)).
82. Id. at 141.
83. ALLEN, supra note 12, at 826.
84. Id. at 827.
85. Id.
86. Simoni, supra note 1, at 242.
87. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 1239 (felony); FLA. STAT ANN. §
755.0845; 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 5/12-2(a)(2) (assault) and 5/12-4(b)(2)
(battery).
88. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 185; D.C. CODE § 22-3112.3(b)(5); FLA. STAT.
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order to interfere with a law enforcement officer's duty.8 9 It is
because these anti-mask laws place an extra burden on law
enforcement to demonstrate criminal intent that one scholar
characterizes them as "weak."" These kind of laws would not allow
police to apprehend Klansmen until after they had manifested clear
intent to commit a crime, which allowed the Klansmen to take their
time committing a criminal act so long as they disappeared and
disrobed quickly afterwards.9' In Ghafari v. Municipal Court, one of
the seminal modern anti-mask cases, the California Court of Appeal
rejected the application of a general anti-mask law to masked student
demonstrators protesting outside the Iranian Consulate in San
Francisco on the grounds that a separate criminal anti-mask law
protected the same state interests through a more narrow
prohibition." One apologist of general laws argues that the Ghafari
court missed the point. If the students had intended to commit
crimes, the criminal anti-mask law would compel police to wait until
they manifested their intent before apprehending them, which greatly
increased the likelihood that they could escape without being
identified.93
This kind of scenario makes general anti-mask laws preferable
from the perspective of law enforcement. General anti-mask laws
typically follow a two-part structure consisting of: (1) broad
prohibitions against any person wearing a face-covering that conceals
his identity in defined public (or semi-public) places;94 and (2)
ANN. § 876.155(4).
89. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3112.3(b)(1); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 876.155(1);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 268, § 34; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.217.
90. Jack Swertfeger, Jr., Municipal Anti-Mask and Anti-Cross Burning
Ordinance: A Model, 1 J. PUB. L. 193,196 (1952).
91. Jack Swertfeger, Jr., Anti-Mask and Anti-Klan Laws, 1 J. PUB. L. 182, 184
(1952) [hereinafter Anti-Klan Laws].
92. Ghafari v. Municipal Court, 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 262 (1978).
93. ALLEN, supra note 12, at 840.
94. Swertfeger's model municipal anti-mask ordinance contains five such
provisions, each of which prohibits, the appearance of any "person, while wearing
any mask, hood, or device whereby any portion of the face is so covered as to conceal
the identity of the wearer." Listed contexts include public roads, public areas of
commerce, public buildings, any kind of request of entry to private premises, and
(most invasively) private meetings unless prior written permission is granted.
Swertfeger, Anti-Klan Laws, supra note 91, at 193. Simoni condenses this section of
his model anti-mask act into one clause, § 100(a), which restricts its scope to public
places, and requires intent to conceal identity in addition to actual concealment of
identity. Simoni, supra note 1, at 268.
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exceptions for enumerated innocuous or desirable practices." These
are "strong" laws insofar as no proof of criminal intent is required,
although a more recent model general anti-mask law requires intent
to conceal identity in addition to actual concealment.16  Law
enforcement is empowered, under these statutes, to apprehend
anyone who wears a mask that provides (and, with the later model, is
intended to provide) anonymity, so long as the behavior does not fall
within a specific exemption. Differences between model general anti-
mask laws drafted in 1952 and 1992 show an inversion in the relative
importance between prohibition and exemption. The 1952 model
proliferates prohibitions to the extent of banning masks in private
meetings on private property without written permission. In contrast,
the 1992 model proliferates exceptions, which are all characterized as
acceptable forms of public anonymity (i.e., visiting an abortion clinic,
buying pornography, participating in a labor dispute, being
arraigned). It also includes an umbrella exception for speech
protected under the First Amendment.97
Whereas earlier courts upheld anti-mask laws in challenges
brought by non-Klan maskers,98 several courts in the late 1970s
upheld the constitutional rights of students who wore masks in
protests against the Shah during the Iranian revolution. In Aryan v.
Mackey, a federal court granted a request by Iranian students to
enjoin Texas Tech University from using a general anti-mask statute
95. In one paragraph of his model ordinance, Swertfeger exempts minors under
sixteen, holiday (i.e., Halloween) costumes, masks worn for work purposes, masks
worn for theatre performance or festivals (i.e., Mardi Gras), and masks worn in "civil
defense drills." Swertfeger, Anti-Klan Laws, supra note 91, at 193-94. Simoni,
writing fifty years later, inverts the emphasis of Swertfeger's ordinance, devoting four
times as much space to exceptions as to the prohibition itself. Section 100(b)(1) of
Simoni's model act explicitly exempts speech protected by the First Amendment.
Section 100(b)(2) enumerates other exceptions, including those obtaining medical
counseling, those working during a labor dispute, those engaged in trade of
pornography, and criminal arrest, arraignment, indictment or trial. Section 100(c)
exempts public officials, and section 100(d) exempts those in violation of a separate
criminal anti-mask act. Simoni, supra note 1, at 268-69.
96. Swertfeger, Anti-Klan Laws, supra note 91, at 196; Simoni, supra note 1, at
268.
97. See supra note 96.
98. See, e.g., City of Pineville v. Marshall, 299 S.W. 1072 (Ky. 1927) (convicting
participants who wore masks in a peaceful parade under a general municipal anti-
mask law); Schumann v. New York, 270 F. Supp. 730 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (denying
requests of the Bread and Puppet Theater to enjoin enforcement of an anti-mask law
against actors engaged in political theatre during a demonstration).
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to prevent a masked protest.99 The court reasoned that the masks had
"become a symbol of opposition" in the context of the revolution, and
were therefore protected as symbolic speech."' The Iranian students
in Ghafari raised the same claim, but the court instead rejected
application of the general anti-mask law on the grounds that it was
overbroad, vague, and denied equal protection.'o
Emboldened by these decisions, Klan affiliates mounted several
new challenges to anti-mask laws. In State v. Miller, Shade Miller
challenged the constitutionality of a Georgia anti-mask law under
which he had been arrested for wearing a Klan mask in public.02 This
was a general anti-mask statute passed in 1951 with the usual broad
prohibitions and limited exceptions of the era."' In rejecting Miller's
First Amendment claims, the Supreme Court of Georgia found: (1)
that there was a substantial state interest in regulating masks to
prevent violence and intimidation; (2) that the state's interest was
content-neutral; and (3) that the statute's application to mask-
wearing that provokes a "reasonable apprehension of intimidation,
threats or violence" was not overbroad." In Church of the American
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, the American Knights argued
that the Klan mask must be protected as symbolic expression under
the First Amendment because it conveys the ideological message of
the organization.' Thus, New York's broad 1845 anti-mask law
should be found unconstitutional." While acknowledging that Klan
99. Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
100. Id. at 92.
101. 87 Cal. App. 3d at 260-66.
102. State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669 (1990).
103. The prohibition section states: "A person is guilty of a misdemeanor when he
wears a mask, hood, or device by which any portion of the face is so hidden,
concealed, or covered as to conceal the identity of the wearer, and is upon any public
way or property or upon private property of another without the written permission
of the owner or occupier of the property to do so." The Georgia Anti-Mask Act, GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-38 (1951).
104. 260 Ga. at 672-73.
105. Church of the American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197,
216 (2d Cir. 2004).
106. The famous 1845 New York anti-mask statute was originally enacted to
apprehend tenant farmers in the Hudson Valley who disguised themselves as
"Indians" to interfere with landlord attempts to serve process and conduct distress
sales. It states that "A person is guilty of loitering when he: Being masked or in any
manner disguised by unusual or unnatural attire or facial alteration, loiters, remains
or congregates in a public place with other persons so masked or disguised, or
knowingly permits or aids persons so masked or disguised to congregate in a public
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masks are symbolic, the Kerik court held that they are not protected
as symbolic expression because they are "redundant" with the Klan
robes and other regalia, and add "no expressive force to the message
portrayed by the rest of the outfit."'" According to the Kerik court,
this "redundancy" shows that Klan masks do not "convey a
particularized message," and therefore they are not protected as
speech.'0 '
These two Klan decisions sparked fresh debate as some critics
defended the general laws," while others criticized the courts for
avoiding more challenging constitutional analyses."o From the latter
perspective, the Miller and Kerik courts should have asked whether
the relevant statutes withstood constitutional challenges under the
"direct violations test" provided in United States v. O'Brien or the
"inhibition test" provided in NAACP v. Alabama."' In United States
v. O'Brien, the Supreme Court upheld a federal law prohibiting
destruction of draft cards against a Vietnam War protester who
claimed his act as "expressive conduct."" 2 Under the O'Brien test,
government must demonstrate a substantial interest in restricting
expressive conduct that is independent of the conduct's
communicative content.1 3 The enumerated lists of exceptions in
general anti-mask laws belie such content neutrality. For example,
the inclusion of exemptions for masquerades, but not for political
place; except that such conduct is not unlawful when it occurs in connection with a
masquerade or like entertainment." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4).
107. 356 F.3d at 206.
108. Id. at 208.
109. See, e.g., Allen, who argues for the retention of "strong" anti-mask laws to aid
the apprehension of Klan-like criminals. "Enforcement of anti-mask laws can thus
prevent the commission of many such crimes before they begin; should prevention
fail, enforcement can aid in apprehension of those who committed the crimes."
ALLEN, supra note 12, at 829.
110. See, e.g., Oskar E. Rey, Antimask Laws. Exploring the Outer Bounds of
Protected Speech Under the First Amendment, 66 WASH. L. REV. 1139, 1148 (1991)
(claiming that the Miller court erred in holding that anti-mask laws are
constitutional); Constitutional Law-Free Speech-Second Circuit Upholds New
York's Anti-Mask Statute Against Challenge by Klan-Related Group-Church of the
American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004), 117
HARV. L. REV. 2777, 2777 (claiming that the Kerik court muddled First Amendment
doctrines of anonymous association and expressive conduct in upholding the New
York anti-mask law).
111. Simoni, supra note 1, at 245-46.
112. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
113. Simoni, supra note 1, at 246.
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protests, implicitly discriminates between entertaining and persuasive
content.114 Content bias may also be implicated by the fact that some
individuals (especially those with unpopular opinions) feel they
cannot speak publicly without anonymity (i.e., the Iranian students in
Ghafari and Aryan)."' If anti-mask laws have the effect of chilling
unpopular speech, they arguably fail the O'Brien test.
The NAACP v. Alabama "inhibition" test puts a finer point on
this need to protect legitimate anonymity. In NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel Patterson, the Court invalidated a state court order requiring the
NAACP to reveal the names and addresses of its Alabama
members.116 The Court held that a law may only inhibit the exercise
of a constitutional right in order to serve a compelling government
interest, and even then must use the least restrictive means to do so.'"
Because anti-mask laws may inhibit the speech of individuals who will
not speak without anonymity, they must satisfy the NAACP test."'
Although crime prevention is a compelling state interest, anti-mask
laws that effectively restrict expressive mask-wearing based on
content (i.e., political rather than entertaining) and restrict legitimate
speakers who require anonymity, do not serve that state interest in
- 119the least restrictive manner.
The anti-mask law debate has not contemplated the use of
religious face-veils. However, a niqabi could easily be convicted
under most general anti-mask laws. There is no common exception
for those who cover their faces in public not for work, celebration,
health, or civic duty but because it is a personal value to do so. Many
of the arguments used to uphold anti-mask laws against Klansmen
could suffice against niqabis. Isn't niqab expressively "redundant"
with hijab? Doesn't the state have a compelling interest in
apprehending criminals or would-be terrorists who would use the
anonymity of nuqub to escape after their crimes? What exception to
a general face-covering prohibition could suffice to protect innocent
niqabis? On the other hand, do potential infringements on expressive
rights of niqabis demonstrate that such laws are overbroad under
NAACP v. Alabama? Should niqabis, like the Klan, be treated by the
114. Id. at 250.
115. Id. at 251.
116. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
117. Id. at 488.
118. Simoni, supra note 1, at 257.
119. Id. at 259.
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law as prospective domestic terrorists?
IV. Niqab Bans
Contemporary prohibition of hijab and face-veils began in the
Arab and Muslim worlds in the context of Westernization,
modernization, and nationalism. Women of dhimmi (non-Muslim
minority) communities in much of the Arab world began to abandon
the veil in the nineteenth century as European capitulation
agreements conferred them legal status as Europeans, and Western
attire became a mark of prestige.120 In Turkey, in the tanzimat era
(1839-1876), upper-class women gradually Westernized, first wearing
Western clothes indoors, then transitioning from the yashmaq to
European lace veils, sometimes attached to stylish European hats.12'
In 1923, the secular Turkish government transformed this social trend
into national policy with "Hat Laws" that banned wearing the
yashmaq in public." Thus, Turkey instigated the first modern veil
ban. Iran followed in the 1930s with comprehensive veil bans as part
of modernization.123
The veil became a battleground for modernization in Egypt in
the early twentieth century, with reformists such as Q5sim Amin
advocating sufur (unveiling) as one of the steps needed for women's
emancipation and social progress.124 The watershed moment came in
1923, however, when the famous Egyptian feminist, Hudd Sha'rdwl,
solemnly cast her veil into the Mediterranean as she returned home
from a women's congress in Rome. Within a generation, the veil had
practically disappeared from Egypt.2 In 1937, the Fatwa Committee
of Al-Azhar (Egypt's leading Sunni Islamic University) declared that
veiling was not a requirement within either of Egypt's two leading
Islamic legal traditions, Hanafi or Maliki madhhabs', thus officially
sanctioning a social revolution that Egyptian women had already
implemented.'26
120. STILLMAN & STILLMAN, supra note 17, at 150.
121. Id. at 152.
122. NIYAzI BERKES, THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECULARISM IN TURKEY 122-26, 473-
75 (1964).
123. See SHAROUGH AKHAVI, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY IRAN:
CLERGY-STATE RELATIONS IN THE PAHLAVI PERIOD 37-55 (1980).
124. STILLMAN & STILLMAN, supra note 17, at 153.
125. Id. at 155.
126. MARGOT BADRAN, FEMINISM IN ISLAM: SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS
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By mid-century, hijab had been banned or simply abandoned by
much of the Arab world; however, veiling practices simultaneously
made a substantial comeback, often for very different reasons.127
Since World War II, only a few governments have made hijab or
burqa obligatory as a matter of policy.128 At the same time, some
Muslim populations adopted the veil even as others abandoned it.
Whereas educated Egyptian feminists cast off their veils, unveiled
peasant women from the villages began veiling as they moved to the
cities as a sign of urbanizing and moving up the social ladder.'29
Similarly, many ex-slave women began wearing burqa in Oman to
symbolize their new sartorial freedom after slavery was abolished in
1950.30 More recently, younger generations of Muslims throughout
the world have adopted al-zayy al-Islami (Islamic dress) and hijab in
rebellion against their secular, pro-Western parents, in political
defiance against corrupt secular governments, and simply because it is
the latest fashion (akhirmoda)."' Globalization and new
communication technologies allow enthusiastic women Islamists to
share a common Islamist fashion aesthetic, reinventing and
reconstructing the umma at a transnational level.132
The contemporary "headscarf debate" is thus not simply a clash
of civilizations between West and East, but also a complex socio-
cultural struggle that has been waged within the Arab and Islamic
worlds for over a century.
A. Contemporary Regulation of Face- Veils
As of this writing, no nation has imposed a general ban on all
CONVERGENCES 94-95 (2009).
127. STILLMAN & STILLMAN, supra note 17, at 157.
128. The most prominent and consistent of these is Saudi Arabia. Iran reinstated
obligatory veiling after the Islamic revolution in 1979. The Taliban enforced veiling
in areas under their control in Afghanistan as have the Acehnese in their province in
North Sumatra, Indonesia. The fatwa authority in Kuwait and Hamas in the
Palestinian territories have both advocated obligatory veiling though neither state's
parliament has endorsed such a policy.
129. Fadwa El-Guindi, Veiling Infitah With Muslim Ethic: Egypt's Contemporary
Islamic Movement, 28 Soc. PROBS. 465, 475 (1981).
130. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra note 18, at 141.
131. ANDREA B. RUGH, REVEAL AND CONCEAL: DRESS IN CONTEMPORARY
EGYPT 154 (1986).
132. NILOFER GOLE, THE FORBIDDEN MODERN: CIVILIZATION AND VEILING 5
(1996).
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forms of Muslim veiling in all public fora.13 However, numerous
measures of narrower scope have been enacted in different nations.
These measures vary in the range of sumptuary practices regulated
from all forms of "religious attire" to face-veils specifically. Some
bans are restricted to public schools or buildings while a few
encompass all public spaces. Some bans are enacted by national
governments, others by municipalities, and some are institutional
regulations, such as school uniform policies.
Although nuqub are included in general headscarf bans, niqab
bans are both narrower than other bans in terms of practices
regulated and broader in terms of spaces regulated. Whereas no
nation has yet imposed a general, universal ban on headscarves,
France and Belgium have passed laws banning all public face-veiling.
Similar measures have been introduced in the Netherlands, Spain,
Italy, Norway, and Australia. Nations unlikely to restrict all forms of
hijab, such as Egypt, have banned niqab in public schools.
Citizenship rights, such as access to immigration, court, and driver's
identification have been denied to niqabis where human rights
violations would likely be found if the subject merely wore hijab.
Tunisia and, until recently, Turkey, had the longest-running bans
against Muslim attire in schools. Turkey's "Hat Law" had banned all
forms of hijab from schools since 1923.'3 Over the decades,
thousands of women have been arrested or harassed for resisting the
ban.'3 ' After repeated attempts by the Turkish Parliament and
executive to repeal the ban, which was always reinstated by the
Constitutional Court, the ban appears to have been lifted decisively at
the end of 2010.131 In Tunisia, where "sectarian dress" was banned in
1981, authorities harassed schoolgirls in 2006, and forced them to
133. The nearest thing to a national hijab ban in recent years was a government
campaign in Tunisia in 2006 in which authorities stopped women in the street and
asked them to unveil. The 2011 popular uprising in Tunisia may put an end to such
efforts. Biman, the national airline of Bangladesh, does not allow veiled women in
their planes, but this is a limited forum, not unlike a public school or government
office.
134. Michael Dickinson, Uproar in Turkey Over the Hijab Headscarf,
COUNTERPUNCH (May 21, 2006), http://www.counterpunch.org/dickinson5 20200 6 .
html.
135. Zafar Bangash, Turkey's Secular Fundamentalists Target Woman Over Hijab,
available at http://www.islamawareness.net/EuropefTurkey/turkey1.htm.
136. HEAD, supra note 9.
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remove their headscarves."' In the aftermath of the "Jasmine
Revolution" in January 2011, demonstrators in Tunisia demanded
"freedom for the hijab, the niqab, and the beard.""
The well-publicized school headscarf bans in France started the
struggle in Europe. It began with the expulsion in 1989 from a public
school near Paris of three Muslim girls who refused to remove their
headscarves. An anti-headscarf campaign by Ernest Cheni6re
followed in 1994, and the movement culminated in President
Sarkozy's 2003 Stasi Commission, whose report on "Laicit6 et
R6publique" deeply influenced the 2004 law against wearing clothing
that "manifests a religious affiliation." 3 9  In Germany, where
governance of school policies is left to the sixteen states, eight states
have implemented measures that prohibit public school teachers from
wearing certain religious articles, including headscarves.'" Kosovo,
which is a Muslim-majority country, justified banning headscarves in
schools in 2010 on the grounds of its constitutional commitment to
secularism. 141
In Egypt, a nation where practices of hijab are widespread and
relatively uncontroversial, various elements of government and civil
society have fought over banning nuqub. The Supreme
Constitutional Court of Egypt on Islamic Law had already considered
the issue of a girl's right to wear niqab in a public school in 1996.142
From 2004 onward, this struggle shifted to the universities. The
American University in Cairo banned nuqub in 2004, as did Helwan
University in 2007.143 The Supreme Administrative Court then found
in 2007 that students at American University in Cairo had a
constitutional right to veil in observance of their religion.'" On
137. ABDELHADI, supra note 8.
138. Lin Noueihed, Islamists March, Police Teargas Tunis Protesters, REUTERS
(Jan. 28, 2011), available at http://af.reuters.com/articlePrint?articleld=AFJOE
70R01C20110128.
139. The progression of the French headscarf ban has already sparked a large
literature of scholarship and analysis. See generally ScoTT, supra note 8; BOWEN,
supra note 8.
140. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 8.
141. BOWEN, supra note 8.
142. See BROWN & LOMBARDI, supra note 52.
143. Rakha, supra note 6.
144. Jaclyn Belczyk, Egypt Court Upholds Niqab Ban for University examinations,
JURIST (Jan. 4, 2010), available at http://jurist.org/paperchase/2010/01/egypt-court-
upholds-niqab-ban-for.php.
[Vol. 35:1240
Face Veil Bans and Anti-Mask Laws
October 3, 2009, Mohamed Sayed Tantawi, Grand Imam of Al-Azhar
Mosque and director of the Al-Azhar school system, criticized a
thirteen-year-old girl for wearing niqab in an all-female classroom.145
Later that month, the government imposed bans on nuqub in public
university dormitories and university examinations. 146 The dormitory
ban was overturned two months later.'47 The examination ban was
upheld on grounds of a legitimate state interest in preventing identity
fraud.148 In contrast to Grand Imam Tantawi, Egypt's Grand Mufti
Ali Gom'aa stated that the right of students to wear niqab should be
limited only by legitimate security concerns.149 It remains to be seen
how this debate will develop after the resignation of Mubarak.
Other nations that have not imposed general bans on Muslim
attire in schools have banned nuqub in schools. In July 2010, Ghiyath
Barakat, Syrian Minister of Higher Education, announced a
comprehensive ban on nuqub at all Syrian university campuses;'s the
Assad administration repealed this measure in April 2011, in an effort
to win the support of Muslim conservatives against the pro-
democracy movement. '' In contrast, an incident in which a Muslim
woman was expelled from an adult education class near Stockholm
for wearing niqab spurred Sweden's Equality Ombudsman to declare
such treatment contrary to the nation's anti-discrimination laws.'52
Despite anti-niqab rhetoric by British politicians,' there have been
no official bans on Muslim attire in the United Kingdom. However,
the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords found in the Begum
145. See Rakha, supra note 6.
146. See Belczyk, supra note 144.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Egypt's Mufti on Niqab Controversy, THE TELEGRAPH, Feb. 15, 2011,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/wikileaks-files/egypt-wikileaks-cables/83 2 6939/
EGYPTS-MUFTI-ON-NIQAB-CONTROVERSY.html (Confidential United States
embassy document, dated November 19, 2009, passed to The Telegraph by
WikiLeaks).
150. Syria Bans Face Veils at Universities, supra note 6.
151. Syria Reverses Ban on Islamic Face Veil, AL ARABIYA NEWS (Apr. 6, 2011),
http://http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/04/06/144466.html.
152. Ombudsman: Student Headscarf Ban Is Wrong, supra note 6.
153. Most notoriously, Jack Straw, an influential Labour MP and cabinet minister,
made statements in October 2006, that he refused to see women constituents who
would not reveal their faces and that he thought nuqub were an unfortunate sign of
the failure of integration policies. He stated that he "would rather" British Muslims
abandoned the niqab. See TARLO, supra note 57, at 144.
2012] 241
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Case that Denbigh High School in Lutton had a right to compel
Shabina Begum, a fourteen-year-old Bangladeshi girl, to stop wearing
jilbab in conformance with the school's uniform policy. 15 4  This
decision appears to sanction British school uniform policies against
potential human rights claims raised by niqabis and others who wear
Muslim attire.
The Netherlands, Australia, and Spain have all taken steps to
pass laws generally banning nuqub in public spaces. In the
Netherlands, Immigration and Integration minister Rita Verconk
announced the introduction of anti-face-covering legislation in
November 2006. That month, Geert Wilders's Freedom Party won
nine seats in the Dutch House of Representatives on an anti-
immigration platform that called for a comprehensive burqa ban.
Doubts regarding the constitutionality of such a ban stalled the
initiative until September 2010, when the ruling center-right parties
agreed to implement Wilders's initiative in exchange for his party's
support. 155
In June 2010, Australian MP Reverend Fred Nile introduced a
bill to the New South Wales provincial government that would
prohibit wearing nuqub in all public spaces.15 ' According to the
proposed Amendment of Summary Offences Act 1988 No. 25, "a
person must not, without reasonable excuse, wear a face-covering
while in a public space."' Although the bill makes no mention of
nuqub or Muslim attire, exceptions for professional and recreational
conduct noninclusive of religious conduct clearly narrow the scope to
prohibit Islamic veils.' The Premier of New South Wales rejected
the bill on August 24, 2010, asserting that it could not be reconciled
with Australian multiculturalism.15 9 Nevertheless, in July 2011, New
South Wales passed a law allowing police to demand removal of veils
154. Begum, supra note 7.
155. HENEGHAN, supra note 5.
156. See United Muslim Women Association, Inc., Community Briefing Paper:
Proposed Law Prohibiting the Niqab in NSW, UNITED MUSLIM WOMEN
ASSOCIATION PUBLIC AFFAIRS ADVISORY COMMITTEE (Niqab Campaign 2010)
[hereinafter Community Briefing Paper], available at http://www.mwa.org.auldocs/
Community%20Briefing%20Paper%20_Niqab%20Campaign_%20August%202010.
pdf.
157. Summary Offences Amendment, supra note 5.
158. Id. §§ 111(3)-(4).
159. Community Briefing Paper, supra note 156, at 1-2.
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for identification.'" This followed a high-profile case in which
Carnita Matthews, a Sydney niqabi, was acquitted of falsely accusing
police of removing her veil because the court could not positively
identify her.'
In Spain, Barcelona has followed the lead of two smaller
Catalonian towns, introducing a ban against wearing any headgear
that impedes identification in public markets and buildings.'62 This
Barcelona municipal law, which went into effect in 2010, may be
enforced in such public spaces as municipal offices, public markets,
and libraries, but not on public streets.'63 The Conservative Popular
Party has advocated extending the law to ban nuqub from all
municipal public space.M In June 2010, the Spanish Senate advanced
a burqa ban in order to outlaw "any usage, custom, or discriminatory
practice that limits the freedom of women."'
Whereas bans against students wearing niqab have found support
in Muslim and non-Muslim societies, few governments in Europe
have imposed a general ban against wearing niqab in public spaces.
The fact that legitimate democratic processes frequently have
rejected face-veil bans belies the claim that democracy cannot abide
veiling. Nevertheless, where other European conservatives failed,
Sarkozy, the defender of French Republicanism, was the first to
prevail. The French ban in 2010 was followed by a Belgian ban in
2011, and a similar Italian ban presently awaits parliamentary
approval.
B. France's Law Prohibiting the Concealment of the Face in Public
Space
On October 7, 2010, France became the first nation to pass into
law a general ban against wearing niqab in any public spaces. In May
2010, Justice Minister Michel Alliott-Curie proposed Bill No. 2520 of
160. Haroon Siddique, Australia's New South Wales Police Allowed to Demand
Burqa Removal, THE GUARDIAN, July 5, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/
2011/jul/05/australia-new-south-wales-police-burqa-removal.
161. Id.
162. See The Islamic Veil Across Europe, BBC NEWS, June 15, 2010, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5414098.stm.
163. Barcelona to Ban Islamic Veils in Some Public Spaces, BBC NEWS, June 15,
2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10316696.
164. Id.
165. The Burqa Debate, supra note 5.
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2010 to prohibit covering the face in public.166 This initial bill banned
covering the face when receiving public services (i.e., entering a
public building or a public bus)."' However, with the enthusiastic
support of President Sarkozy and the French conservatives who had
passed the 2004 headscarf ban, the French National Assembly
expanded Bill No. 2520 into a comprehensive niqab ban which they
approved on July 14.168 Amnesty International issued a statement
condemning the vote and proclaiming that governments should focus
on expanding rather than narrowing choices available to women.19
Nevertheless, on October 11, 2010, the French Senate
overwhelmingly approved the bill as Loi, or Law, No. 2010-1192,
"prohibiting the concealment of the face in public space."o Article 5
delayed enforcement until April 2011."
In order to appear impartial and reasonable, Loi No. 2010-1192
avoids specific mention of nuqub or Islam, and thus resembles a
general, "strong" United States anti-mask law in many respects.
Article 1 of the Loi, like the first part of most general anti-mask laws,
simply proclaims that "none may wear a garment intended to conceal
his face in a public space."172 Article 2 is divided into two subsections.
The first defines "public space" to include all public thoroughfares
and other places open to the public."'7  The second, like the second
part of most general anti-mask laws, enumerates exceptions to this
sweeping prohibition. In the case of Loi No. 2010-1192, exempted
practices include garments explicitly authorized by law, garments
related to health or professional use, and practices associated with
sports, festivals, or artistic or traditional performances.174
166. John Haylett, Unveiling the Errors of Forced Conformism, MORNING STAR
ONLINE (July 16, 2010), http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/index.php/news/
content/view/full/9289.
167. Britton D. Davis, Lifting the Veil: France's New Crusade, 34 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 117, 118 (2011).
168. Sergio Stone, French Bill No. 2520 of 2010 on burqas and niqabs, LEGAL
RESEARCH PLUS (July 14, 2010), available at http://Iegalresearchplus.com/2010/07/
14/french-bill-no-2520-of-2010-on-burqas-and-niqabs/.
169. France Votes to Ban Full-Face Veils, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (July 13,
2010), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/france-votes-ban-full-face-veils-
2010-07-13.
170. Law No. 2010-1192, supra note 3.
171. Id.
172. Id. art. 1.
173. Id. art. 2(I).
174. Id. art. 2(11).
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When the law came into effect on April 11, 2011, some women
challenged the law and were met with sporadic enforcement. The
police were issued guidelines instructing them not to remove veils in
public, but to escort violators to a police station for identification.
Authorities printed four hundred thousand leaflets to be issued as a
warning; these proclaimed, "the Republic lives with its face
uncovered." 176 Police detained two niqabis who participated in a
protest at Notre Dame cathedral, and claimed the arrests were for
participation in an unauthorized demonstration, not for violation of
the niqab ban.'7 1 On the same day, a niqabi was detained in a parking
structure outside a shopping mall near Paris and issued a 150 fine. 7 1
The next morning, police detained a niqabi who attempted to enter a
town hall in Saint-Denis, north of Paris.179 Police asked her to remove
her veil, and when she refused, they escorted her to a police station
where she removed it to be identified, but then put it back on again."'
Police declined to fine her, but did give her one of the prepared
leaflets.'81 Rachid Nekkaz, a French Muslim, stated that he would
create a fund to pay any fines incurred by niqabis violating the law."2
A French Muslim couple living in the United Kingdom has lodged a
complaint with the ECHR, claiming that the French law restricts their
right of free movement across Europe."3
175. Women in Face Veils Detained as France Enforces Ban, BBC NEWS, Apr. 11,
2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13031397. The guidelines also note
that the law does not prevent women from wearing veils in private vehicles, but they
encourage police to enforce road safety rules against niqabi drivers. See Angelique
Chrisafis, French Police Detain Veil Ban Protesters, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 11, 2011,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/11/french-police-detain-veil-protesters.
176. Gavin Hewitt, Banning the Burka, BBC NEWS, Apr. 11, 2011,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/2011/04/banning-the burka.htm
1. Given there are approximately two thousand women in France who wear niqab, it
appears that authorities prepared around two hundred warnings per potential
violator.
177. Women in Face Veils Detained, supra note 175.
178. Chrisafis, French Veil Ban: First Woman Fined for Wearing Niqab, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 12, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/12/ french-veil-
ban-woman-niqab-fined.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Hewitt, supra note 176.
183. Muslim Couple in UK Challenge French Veil Ban in Court, BARNABAS AID
(June 17, 2011), http://barnabasfund.org/Muslim-couple-in-UK-challenge-French-
veil-ban-in-court.html.
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The example of United States anti-mask laws provides useful
insights into the complexity of the niqab ban. As with anti-mask laws,
a "criminal" niqab ban would have been far less problematic.
However, the Sarkozy administration sought to prohibit practices that
were merely "menacing," much like the desire of American
legislators to prohibit the public appearance of Klansmen in their
hoods. As American anti-mask laws avoided specific mention of
Klan hoods to avoid charges of viewpoint discrimination, so French
legislators felt constrained by principles of equality enshrined in their
laws. As a result, Loi No. 2010-1192, like a general anti-mask law,
stipulates an extremely broad prohibition, and struggles to enumerate
reasonable exceptions. As the American example shows, it is
extremely difficult to enforce such a law impartially and consistently.
C. Laws Against Concealing the Face in Belgium and Italy
In 2011, Belgium became the second European nation to enact a
comprehensive ban on wearing niqab in public. The successful law
followed over a year of stifled attempts. In April 2010, the lower
house of the Belgian parliament had become the first European
legislature to pass a niqab ban. The bill proposed to amend the
Belgian Penal Code to prohibit wearing any clothing in public spaces
that "completely or largely covers the face."" However, Prime
Minister Yves Leterme's governing coalition collapsed soon
afterwards,185 and the Belgian Senate failed to ratify the bill into
law.'8 Nevertheless, many Belgian cities have municipal "carnival
regulations" that prohibit face-hiding masks or make-up in public
space except during designated public festivals."' In 2009, police in
the municipality of Etterbeek used such a code to fine a Muslim
woman for wearing niqab while taking her children to school." On
184. Lourdes Peroni, Would a Niqab And Burqa Ban Pass The Strasbourg Test?,
STRASBOURG OBSERVERS, (May 4, 2010), http://strasbourgobservers.com/2010/05/04/
burqa-and-niqab-ban/.
185. Mark Tran, Belgian Government Collapses After Party Quits Coalition, THE
GUARDIAN, Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/22/belgian-
government-collapses-party-quits.
186. Saila Ouald-Chaib, Local "Burqa Ban" Violates Human Rights (According to
Belgian Judge), STRAS3OURG OBSERVERS (Feb. 16, 2011), http://strasbourgobservers.
com/2011/02/16/local-%E2%80%9Cburqa-ban%E2%80%9D-violates-human-rights-
according-to-belgian-judgel.
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January 26, 2011, a Belgian judge of the Tribunal de Police de
Bruxelles found that the government had failed to demonstrate the
necessity of such an intrusive restriction in a democratic society.'
However, in June 2011, the Belgian Senate approved a similar
bill, which went into effect on July 23, 2011. The new law "forbidding
the wearing of all clothing completely or substantially concealing the
face" inserted a new article "563 bis" into the Belgian Code Penal,
which imposes a fine from E15 to 625 and up to seven days
incarceration for anyone who appears in public with the face "masked
or entirely or partially disguised, in such a way that the person cannot
be identified."'" The Belgian House of Representatives, perhaps
having learned tactical lessons from its previous attempt, rejected
amendments proposed by Jean-Marie Dedecker that explicitly
banned "Islamic clothing" including "the burqa or the niqab.""' Two
Belgian niqabis have already challenged the law in the Belgian
Constitutional Court as an infringement of "fundamental rights such
as the freedom of religion and expression." 19 2
Municipalities in Italy resurrected old anti-mask laws to ban
burqas in 2004, and the town of Novara passed a new by-law in 2010
to deter public veiling."' However, it was the example of Egypt that
inspired the Italian anti-niqab movement at the national level. In
October 2009, Barbara Saltamartini, an Italian parliamentarian,
invoked Tantawi's reprimand of an Egyptian schoolgirl to argue that
a burqa ban could not be anti-Muslim because wearing a burqa is not
a religious obligation. 94 Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi and his
coalition adopted this rhetoric to justify a campaign to ban niqab and
burqa.'95 They proposed to base their new legislation on a 1975 anti-
terrorism law prohibiting conduct that prevents authorities from
189. Id.
190. Law Banning the Covering of the Face in Public, supra note 3.
191. "Proposition de loi visant A interdire le port de tout v8tement cachant
totalement ou de manibre principale le visage," Chambres des Repr6sentants de
Belgique, Doc. 53-0219/004, 23 (Apr,. 18, 2011), available at http://www.dekamer.be/
FLWB/pdf/53/0219/53KO219004.pdf.
192. Belgium Ban on Face Veil Comes into Force, AL JAZEERA, July 24, 2011,
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/europe/2011/07/201172323568511290.html.
193. The Islamic Veil Across Europe, supra note 162.
194. Joseph Mayton, Europe Takes Advantage of Egypt's Tantawi Niqab Ban
Calls, BIKYAMASR (Oct. 7, 2009), available at http://bikyamasr.com/wordpress/
?p=4599.
195. Id.
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determining someone's identity.'
The resulting anti-niqab bill is poised to become Italian law if
approved by the Camera dei Deputati late 2011. Representative
Bertolini proposed a bill in October 2010 that modified Article 5 of
Law 152/1975 and introduced a new Article 612 into the Penal Code
to regulate concealment of the face.'" Unlike the Belgian parliament,
which chose to exclude mention of Islamic clothing, Italian legislators
explicitly ban "ethnic or cultural" clothes, "like the burqa and the
niqab" that impede "recognition of the face."' 9 The law provides for
a fine ranging from 300 to 500. " The law's modification to the
Penal Code created a new crime for forcing someone to conceal the
face in a public place. 200 Lastly, the new Italian law includes a
provision that denies Italian citizenship to anyone convicted of the
crime of forcing another to conceal her face.20'
D. The Right to Cover the Face in a Democratic Society
The wearing of a face-veil, like the wearing of a mask or any
other article of clothing, may be construed as an expressive act, and
the anonymity gained thereby is an aspect of personal privacy. As
such, the right to cover the face is protected by various national and
international legal instruments. Article 19 of the UDHR and Article
19(2) of the ICCPR provide freedom of expression. UDHR Article
12 and ICCPR Article 17(1) provide that "no one shall be subjected
to arbitrary interference with his privacy." Likewise, Article 10 of the
ECHR provides that "everyone has the right to freedom of
expression." ECHR Article 8(1) provides that "everyone has the
right to respect for his private ... life."
Sections 8(2) and 10(2) of the ECHR enumerate the exceptions
available to the state to justify abrogation of the rights to free
expression and privacy respectively. In both sections, these include
interests of national security, public safety, prevention of disorder or
crime, protection of health or morals, and protection of the rights of
others. The ECHR stipulates that abrogation of rights should satisfy
196. Id.
197. See CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI, Doc. No. 3760, supra note 4.
198. Id. at 4.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 4-5.
201. Id. at 5.
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interests "necessary in a democratic society."
Although justifications for niqab bans have been couched in
numerous contexts specific to national and local cultures, these may
be reduced to five basic arguments. These arguments represent five
asserted state interests that more or less resemble those enumerated
in the ECHR. As it turns out, none of these arguments can be
maintained without sacrificing the principles of equality and non-
discrimination to which most nations have committed themselves
through such international instruments as the UDHR or ECHR, if
not their own laws. None of these asserted interests are sufficiently
"necessary" to justify exempting a state from its legal obligations to
its own citizens.
The most widespread argument is that the inability to identify
peoples' faces presents a security risk. This fear has been stoked by a
variety of reports of criminals wearing face-concealing Muslim attire
to evade detection. 20 2 This rationale is similar to the justification of
United States anti-mask laws to prevent Klansmen from using their
anonymity to commit crimes. However, modern anti-mask cases have
refused to find a compelling state interest in prohibiting masks where
there is no reasonable apprehension of an imminent crime. Likewise,
where there is no basis to suspect niqabis of imminent crimes, the
security rationale makes little sense. Furthermore, especially in the
cold climates of northern Europe, such a rationale will inevitably be
applied inconsistently. The police will not arrest everyone who wears
a balaclava or shawl to protect against the cold.203 The rationale
becomes laughable when we imagine the fashionable ladies of
seventeenth century England in their protective vizards, who, by this
logic, would comprise a security threat.
A second, related argument is that an open, democratic society
requires a transparency and reciprocity impeded by covering the face.
This argument is part of what underlies the French rhetoric that finds
headscarves generally incompatible with latcit. The fact that veiling
remained popular amongst non-Muslim French women through the
202. For example, Mustaf Jamma, accused of murdering a British policewoman,
was reported by some newspapers to have dressed in a veil in order to cross the
border undetected. These reports failed to note that women generally lift their veils
at British checkpoints. See Inquiry Call On "Suspect in Veil", BBC NEWS, Dec. 21,
2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk news/england/west~yorkshire/ 6195581.stm.
203. Martha Nussbaum, Veiled Threats?, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2010,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/11/veiled-threats/.
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late nineteenth century problematizes this claim. Another variation
of this rationale is that face-veils are inherently intimidating, and thus
infringe upon the rights of those who see women in niqab.20 4 To
privilege such a rationale would be to sanction an undefined range of
prejudices that might as easily ban turbans or yarmulkes.205 More
fundamentally, there exists no positive right granted by national or
international law (in France, in any case) to be allowed to see the
bare face of another person.20 Thus, the requirement that a niqabi
reveal her face in public cannot be defended as a duty owed to
others.207
A third argument holds that nuqub are symbols of male
patriarchy that must be abolished to promote gender equality. A
fourth, related argument holds that women only wear nuqub because
they are coerced, and thus the state has a legitimate duty to protect
them. The French niqab ban invokes this latter argument by
imposing special fines against men found to compel women to veil.
As discussed supra in Parts II and III, there is no single "meaning" to
the wearing of face-veils, including nuqub. Likewise, the element of
free choice in face-veiling, as in many other areas of sumptuary
practice, is complex and not reducible to male coercion. States that
have contemplated niqab bans have produced no evidence that
veiling is coerced. Furthermore, if states truly wished to ban practices
that are symbols of gender inequality, they might start with
pornography.20 8
Lastly, some observers have argued that nuqub are inherently
unhealthy, and therefore should be banned to promote public
welfare. The same argument was heard frequently regarding the
burqa during the buildup to the war in Afghanistan. Others protest,
in contrast, that concealing Muslim attire serves positive health
functions by protecting the body from dust and the skin from sun
damage.209 In any case, there is little compelling evidence to support
the extreme claim that face-veils present public health hazards.
204. Zara Syed, Banning the Niqab, ISLAMIC INSIGHTS, June 21, 2010,
http://www.islamicinsights.com/news/international-news/banning-the-niqab.html.
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Ironically, the French law acknowledges exceptions for face coverings
worn to promote good health, such as the surgical masks that became
popular during the SARS epidemic. This controversy resembles the
debate that arose in France and England in the nineteenth century
when manufacturers promoted ladies' veils as protections against
urban grit while some doctors feared that the lace mesh could damage
vision.
These arguments, that it is "necessary to a democratic society" to
abrogate the right to cover the face in public, are incoherent. They
are based on unfounded speculation, and enforcement of such
measures will inevitably be discriminatory. As a result, French Loi
No. 2010-1192 should not be upheld against challenges raised under
Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR.
V. Conclusion
It is no secret that the purpose of niqab bans is to regulate
Muslim women just as the purpose of most United States anti-mask
laws was to regulate the Klan. However, principles of non-
discrimination necessitate the drafting of general prohibitions that do
not target specific populations. Thus, these measures universally
abrogate the right to cover the face, and struggle to carve out
coherent exceptions. In order to reconcile these measures with such
instruments as ECHR Articles 8 and 10, they must demonstrate that
their prohibitions serve legitimate state interests. In crafting such
arguments, proponents of niqab bans dissemble the underlying
discriminatory intentions of their laws. They advance a chimerical
vision of Western civilization that erases a long and multi-vocal
heritage of masking and veiling across Muslim and non-Muslim
societies.
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